For a class at CBTS, I have been reading Continuity and Discontinuity: Perspectives on the Relationship Between the Old and New Testaments. We were recently required to evaluate the chapter titled above. I found it to be a very thought provoking chapter and liked its content in general. Feinberg is very thorough and has a great ability to identify important details that demand consideration where others have, to use his words, "conflated a number of issues that need to be separated." The problem of the relationship between the Old and New Testaments is not an easy one.
That being said, I have several questions/problems with Feinberg’s proposal for meaning in the OT. Two of which I will highlight here.
First, Feinberg addresses the issue of meaning in the context of OT predictions and states that meaning is associated with authorial intent, in this case human and divine. I normally would have no problem with this statement. However, Feinberg spent the paragraphs before explaining that what he intends by “human and divine” is to say that the divine author’s intent is the same as the human author’s intent. I will illustrate why I disagree with this in a moment. But if we assume it to be true for the sake of argument, it makes his following explanation of sense and reference very confusing. Feinberg asserts that sense is roughly equivalent to meaning, whereas the reference is equivalent to the actual object or state of affairs referred to (117). In the case of OT prediction, the sense is easily known, but the reference is “not known except to God” (118). This last phrase is important, because it identifies the problem and possibly a false dichotomy. If an author knows both the sense and the reference, are they not both part of his intention, especially if the author is the One bringing about the reference? Clearly we cannot say that the human author knows both “sense” and “reference” in the case of predictive Scripture. However, the divine author does, and it would seem that both are what He intended. So I think that saying that there is a sense that is known by the human author and a reference that is not known by the human author may be legitimate. Conversely, I think that saying the reference is not included in the intention (and therefore meaning) of the divine author is illegitimate.
Furthermore, the fact that Feinberg displays his view of God in regards to God’s knowledge of the future in the quote in the above paragraph is significant, and it seems inconsistent with the idea that the human author and the divine author have the same intention. In the case of predictive literature, the human author’s intent is to give a snapshot of the divine author’s intent. Thus both of their intents are in line with one another, but the divine author’s is more informed so to speak, because He knows the actual referent.
I find a second problem in Feinberg’s discussion of types. If we assume that Feinberg’s statement about divine and human intent is true, again for the sake of argument, it would naturally be assumed that it should be applied across the board to genres other than predictive literature. Thus in narrative literature, the human author’s intent would give the meaning of the text. It would seem that Feinberg is departing from this with his discussion of OT types. If you stayed consistent, there would be two options (the second flowing out of the first): first, because the human author did not intend the type, the type is not included in the meaning of the text. Second, either the type must be abandoned because it is not what the OT text means, or one preach a meaning that is external to the text.
I find it difficult to see how the human author could have intended a type that would find its antitype in the NT. I am not denying that types exist—I find no difficulty in seeing how the divine author could have intended a type that would find its antitype in the NT; I am saying that types do not fit into a model of authorial intent where the intent of the divine author is limited to the intent of the human author. Even Feinberg would seem to agree with this conclusion when he says “it is not hard to accept that such analogies were intended by God. What would be a matter of debate is whether the analogy drawn in the NT is a true exegesis of the original event” (122).
So I repeat the question, if an author knows both the sense and the reference, are they not both part of his intention, especially if the author is the One bringing about the reference?
Thoughts anyone?
4 comments:
Prophesy and prophetism - the prophet did not necessarily need to understand the meaning of the prophesy.
Daniel 12:8-10 8 I heard, but I did not understand. Then I said, "O my lord, what shall be the outcome of these things?" 9 He said, "Go your way, Daniel, for the words are shut up and sealed until the time of the end. 10 Many shall purify themselves and make themselves white and be refined, but the wicked shall act wickedly. And none of the wicked shall understand, but those who are wise shall understand.
This answer may be too simple for a complex question - but at least it is a start.
Chris, your answer is good, and I think that I would agree that the prophet did not have to understand the full implications of his prophecy.
However, specific use of this passage for the argument is not without its responses. Feinberg specifically addresses this passage with an exegetical argument from Kaiser (who holds that the divine and human authorial intent is the same) where Kaiser concludes that this passage does not mean that Daniel doesn't understand what he wrote. (By the way, Kaiser also does the same thing with the 1 Peter passage). Although Feinberg recognizes some potential flaws with Kaiser's model, he makes it clear that he agrees with Kaiser. And some would raise the argument that using this passage this way opens the door to a dictation theory of inspiration, which I would shy away from. Also, I believe some would couch this passage in an apocalyptic genre, which could raise some other issues.
I personally would have to do some deeper study of this passage in order to make a conclusive argument from it.
Thanks for you input
Rob,
Love the post. Concerning types, of course Feinberg would allow types into his herm. I think your arguement is creating a straw man out of his position. His whole purpose in deleniating types is to deal with non-predictive prophecy fullfillment phenomina as identified in the Canon. He would postulate that there is a different sense here because of a different category.
Concerning Feinberg on predictive prophesy, I would agree with you on that he places a false dic. between the Divine intent and Human intent on the level of sense and referent. That is why I believe in a reserved sensus plenior. Most theologians pragmatical believe some aspect of the OT can be reinterpreted through the Christ event. I just hold to the sense is reinterpreted, not the referent. The divine author understood the foundational sense in which the human author then pens the contemporary manifestation of the sense. That is why a meta-linguistic approach reveals the little a intent in the OT and the big A intent through the Canon.
To discuss this more at juncture would be obsured for a book would even suffice. Well continue to talk.
Russel, what I was highlighting was that it seems inconsistent to hold to a single authorial intent (big A and little a are the same) and also see the validity of types. This is because, in my mind, if you believe in single authorship AND see type that the human author did not intend, then you are getting away from authorial intent with that type (besides the fact that Feinberg said that God DID intend the type). Do you see the consistency that I am seeing? Maybe I am just missing a connection.
I am not saying that I think that types are invalid. I think that types are valid IF you believe in dual authorship, but I struggle with how types are valid in a single author framework like Feinberg's.
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